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Bold assertions have been made in policy reports and popular articles on the high and increasing 
enrollment in Pakistani religious schools, commonly known as madrassas. Given the importance 
placed on the subject by policy makers in Pakistan and those internationally, it is troubling that 
none of the reports and articles reviewed based their analysis on publicly available data or 
established statistical methodologies. This paper uses published data sources and a census of 
schooling choice to show that existing estimates are inflated by an order of magnitude. Madrassas 
account for less than 1 percent of all enrollment in the country and there is no evidence of a 
dramatic increase in recent years. The educational landscape in Pakistan has changed 
substantially in the last decade, but this is due to an explosion of private schools, an important 
fact that has been left out of the debate on Pakistani education. Moreover, when we look at school 
choice, we find that no one explanation fits the data. While most existing theories of madrassa 
enrollment are based on household attributes (for instance, a preference for religious schooling or 
the household’s access to other schooling options) the data show that among households with at 
least one child enrolled in a madrassa, 75 percent send their second (and/or third) child to a public 
or private school or both. Widely promoted theories simply do not explain this substantial 
variation within households. 
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1.  Introduction 
Bold assertions, based on reports and articles, are being made about high and increasing 
enrollment in Pakistani religious schools in recent years.  This “rise” is attributed to an increasing 
preference for religious schooling among families or the lack of other viable schooling options for 
the household (Burki 2001, Singer 2001). Given the importance placed on the subject by policy 
makers in Pakistan and those internationally, it is troubling that none of the reports and articles 
reviewed base their analysis on publicly available data sources or established statistical 
methodologies. 2 
This paper uses established data sources as well as data collected by the authors for a 
broader study on education enrollment in Pakistan to examine the size and importance of the 
religious education sector in Pakistan. Our findings differ by an order of magnitude from those 
reported by and in the media. The madrassa sector is small compared to educational options such 
as public and private schooling, and accounts for less than 1 percent of overall enrollment in the 
country. Even in the districts that border Afghanistan where madrassa enrollment is the highest in 
the country, it is less than 7.5 percent of all enrolled children. Furthermore, we find no evidence 
of a dramatic increase in madrassa enrollment in recent years. The share of madrassas in total 
enrollment declined before 1975 and has increased slowly since then. Since 2001 total enrollment 
in madrassas has remained constant in some districts and increased in others. When we look at 
school choice, explanations for madrassa enrollment based on household attributes such as 
religiosity appear inadequate. Even among the less than 1 percent of families who have children 
enrolled in madrassas, more than 75 percent send their other children to private and public 
schools.  
Madrassa enrollment figures cited in the popular press and institutional reports, none of 
which are substantiated using publicly verifiable data, are sometimes highly inflated. For 
example, between March 2002 and July 2002, figures for madrassa enrollment cited in The 
Washington Post tripled from 500,000 to 1.5 million. A report about madrassas by the 
International Crisis Group (ICG) in 2002 puts madrassa enrollment between 1 and 1.7 million; 
the report claimed that this number represents 33 percent of all Pakistani children enrolled in 
schools, when in fact it is less than 1 percent. Similar numbers were reported in other major 
newspapers and influential publications like the 9-11 Commission Report.  
                                                 
2 See for example President Bush’s remarks on June 24, 2003, President Musharraf’s remarks on November 20th 
2003, Colin Powell’s on March 11, 2004, Hillary Clinton on February 24, 2004 and the 9-11 Commission Report. 
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The only publicly available sources of data to document patterns of enrollment and 
available educational options for Pakistani families are household-based surveys. These are the 
official 1998 Census of Population (Government of Pakistan)3, the 1991, 1998, and 2001 rounds 
of the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey4, and a 2003 census of schooling choice conducted 
by our research team. The fact that three sources use different definitions of madrassa enrollment, 
and were collected at different times by individuals with very different institutional affiliations 
provides independent verification of enrollment estimates and allows us to determine the 
sensitivity of our results.  
The household data tell us whether a child is enrolled full-time in a madrassa, but not 
whether a child goes for an hour on any given day to study the Quran. Therefore this data does 
not confound full-time with part-time attendees—a child who attends a public school during the 
day and a madrassa in the evening is recorded as enrolled in a public school. This is an important 
distinction since parents might use a modicum of madrassa or mosque based education to teach 
their children about religion. Consequently, if we contrast these household-based numbers with 
numbers from establishment-based reports, discrepancies can arise. From virtually any policy 
perspective, including evening quran classes in enrollment figures seems misguided. Regrettably, 
until now almost all enrollment numbers cited have been based on establishment surveys which 
do just that.  
These data sources show that around 200,000 children were enrolled full-time in 
madrassas before 2001. Since 2001, our school census suggests that these numbers may have 
increased somewhat, although the experience varies across districts. To put this number in 
context, total primary enrollment (grades 1-5) in public and private schools stood at 17.4 million 
in 2003 (Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, 2003). The choice of madrassa schooling 
viewed as either the percentage of eligible children or the percentage of enrolled children, is 
statistically insignificant for the average Pakistani household. Enrollment in madrassas accounts 
for approximately 0.3 percent of all children between the ages of 5 and 19. Given that the overall 
enrollment rate for this age group is roughly 42 percent, this represents less than 0.7 percent of all 
enrolled children, an order of magnitude less than the 33 percent cited by the International Crisis 
Group report (2002).  
                                                 
3 This is complemented with the census of private schools carried out by the Federal Bureau of Statistics in 2000 
to provide statistics for private versus public enrollment. 
4The PIHS is the equivalent of the widely used Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS) implemented in 
various countries. See http://www.worldbank.org/lsms for extensive notes on the 1991 PIHS. See also 
www.statpak.gov.pk for information on the census and the Federal Bureau of Statistics data.  
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The significant differences across regions and trends over time help us understand 
average madrassa enrollment. In terms of proportions of the enrolled population, the top 10  
districts out of a total of 101 lie in the so-called “Pashtun” belt on the western border of 
Afghanistan. Outside the Pashtun belt, madrassa enrollment is thinly, but evenly, spread across 
the rest of the country. Madrassa enrollment declined from 1940 to 1980 but increased during the 
religion-based resistance to the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets in 1979. The largest jump 
in madrassa enrollment is for the cohort aged 10 in the period 1989-93—coinciding with the 
withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Taliban. 
Outside the “Pashtun” belt, the distribution of madrassa enrollment at the level of the 
village is spread evenly with most variation within rather than between villages. Among the 
households covered by our 2003 census, we find the same pattern. The prevailing hypothesis that 
households do not have other schooling options and thus send their children to religious schools, 
or that households are religiously minded and thus choose madrassas over private and public 
schools is not supported by the data.  
We looked at households with at least two enrolled children where one child attends a 
madrassa. Such households are small in number, accounting for less than 1 percent of the sample. 
Among these households, less than 25 percent send all their children to madrassas; in contrast, 50 
percent send their children to both madrassas and public schools and another 27 percent use the 
private school option. This “stylized fact” requires a theory of variation between children rather 
than households to explain such enrollment.5 Widely promoted theories of madrassa enrollment 
based on household-level attributes such as income or religiosity and village-level characteristics, 
such as alternative schooling options, simply do not explain the substantial variation within 
households. 
Our data are not extensive enough to answer the important question of what explains 
enrollment in madrassas either. Instead we offer suggestive evidence for the various hypotheses 
forwarded in the literature on factors that may lead to enrollment in a madrassa. Although we find 
that the Afghan war during the 1980s had an impact on madrassa enrollment, our ability to 
predict madrassa enrollment using multivariate regressions is poor. There is weak evidence to 
support the hypothesis that poorer and less-educated families are more likely to send a child to a 
madrassa, and somewhat stronger findings that poor children in settlements without a school use 
                                                 
5 One such theory, familiar to historians of religious schooling in European countries, is primogeniture 
(inheritance of the first-born of the parent’s wealth), which often led to secular education for the first-born and careers 
in the church for younger siblings. Other explanations could be differences between siblings in terms of their abilities, 
gender, or health (for instance, disabled children may be more likely to be enrolled in madrassas). 
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madrassas more often. There is no evidence for explanations based on household preferences 
such as religiosity.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes recent 
literature (including the popular press) on the extent and penetration of madrassa enrollment. 
Section 3 uses existing data sources as well as our own survey to provide a comprehensive picture 
of madrassa enrollment. Section 4 looks at geographical variation in madrassa enrollment and 
trends over time. Sections 5 and 6 examine variation across households and comment on the 
consistency of the data with some hypotheses that have been advanced by other authors. Section 7 
concludes. 
2.  What do Reports and the Popular Press Say? 
We looked at three different types of articles and reports: articles in mainstream 
American and international newspapers; reports and articles by American and international 
scholars affiliated with international think tanks, institutes, and the government (including the 9-
11 Commission Report); and studies by Pakistani scholars working in Pakistan and abroad. The 
sources for all these reports are either newspaper accounts of police estimates or interviews with 
policymakers. We have yet to find a single article that tries to validate these numbers using 
established data sources.  
We searched 10 major newspapers using FACTIVA in June 2004 for articles published 
in the past three years that mention “madrassas.” Table A1 in the appendix shows the range of 
figures and their underlying sources for the 44 articles found.6 Three facts stand out. First, 
enrollment figures vary widely, ranging from 500,000 children to 1.5 million children. Worse (as 
discussed above), was a lack of consistency in estimates from the same newspaper. Second, only 
two articles benchmarked these numbers with the total number of children enrolled in schools 
(Hussain and McGory in The Times, August 2002 and Kraul in The Los Angeles Times, April 
2003). There is a sea of difference between the proportions they report—according to The Los 
Angeles Times, 10 percent of all Pakistani students are being educated in madrassas; The Times, 
however, citing an International Crisis Group Report (discussed later) suggests that this 
proportion is closer to 33 percent. The use of numbers rather than percentages affects perceptions. 
As we see later, our understanding of madrassas and their prevalence changes dramatically when 
                                                 
6 Newspapers searched include the Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Financial Times, The Guardian (U.K.), ,The 
Independent (London), Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, The Philadelphia Inquirer, The Times (London) and 
The Washington Post for at least 3 occurrences of the word “madrassa” (spelled in different ways) from January 2001 
to June 2004. 
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we present enrollment in madrassas as percentages, either of all school-aged children or of all 
enrolled students, rather than numbers. Third, all the articles rely completely on secondary 
sources. While we cannot reasonably expect newspapers to use primary data sources, the articles 
failed to acknowledge the accuracy of enrollment estimates using an appropriate disclaimer. 
The 9-11 Commission Report adopted the same methodology of interviews and reporting 
numbers based on secondary sources. We quote in full the passage relating to madrassas: 
 
“Pakistan's endemic poverty, widespread corruption, and often ineffective 
government create opportunities for Islamist recruitment. Poor education is a 
particular concern. Millions of families, especially those with little money, send 
their children to religious schools, or madrassahs. Many of these schools are the 
only opportunity available for an education, but some have been used as 
incubators for violent extremism. According to a Karachi's police commander, 
there are 859 madrassahs teaching more than 200,000 youngsters in his city 
alone.” (Section 12.2). 
 
This report provides only a footnote quoting an interview with a police commander and 
does not attempt to validate the numbers provided. Striking, yet unsubstantiated claims such as 
“Millions of families…send their children to religious schools”  are of particular concern given 
the emphasis on identifying and curbing potential sources of extremism. Moreover, even the 
secondary sources referred to in the report do not base their estimates on published data sources.  
The public perception of madrassas and their role in Pakistani education have been 
strongly influenced by three published pieces (both in journals and policy reports): an article 
written by Jessica Stern (2000) in Foreign Affairs, a piece by Jonathan Singer (2001) for the 
Brookings Institution, and a report by the International Crisis Group (2002), an independent, non-
profit organization. Stern (2000) refers to “…the estimated 40,000 to 50,000 madrassas in 
Pakistan…” without identifying any verifiable source. Singer (2001) claims that, “…there are as 
many as 45,000 such schools within Pakistan…” although he admits that “…the exact number 
has never been determined.”  
The ICG report, published in July 2002, is the only one that estimates the number of 
students enrolled. Consequently, it has been a definitive source for estimates of madrassa 
enrollment numbers—6 out of 11 articles written after July 2002 in our FACTIVA search 
referenced the report. The influence of this report was undoubtedly bolstered by its claim that, 
“about a third of all children in Pakistan in education attend madrassas.” This 33 percent 
estimate of the fraction of enrolled children in madrassas is much higher than the only other 
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available figure, reported in The Los Angeles Times (2003), which puts the number at 10 percent. 
We discuss these in some detail below. 
Pakistani scholars also tend to use secondary or unverifiable sources. For instance, in the 
highly original and detailed work on Islamic religious scholarship by Zaman (2002) and a series 
of articles by Tariq Rahman (2004), the number of madrassa students and establishments is 
sourced from newspaper articles in Pakistan (The Dawn, 22 May 2002 and 16 January 2003). The 
newspaper articles in turn quote a police press release, where again the raw data is not available 
for verification. Similarly, Ahmed Rashid (2000) writes in his best-selling book on the Taliban: 
“…in 1988 there were 8,000 madrassa and 25,000 unregistered ones, educating over half a 
million students.” The source cited in Footnote 13 of Chapter 6 of the book is “Intelligence report 
presented to the cabinet of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1992.” 
 Finally, the purpose of many of these articles and reports was to try and explain the 
popularity of madrassas, not estimate the numbers of enrolled children.  The final column in 
Table A1 describes the main reasons advanced in newspaper articles. Of these, one of the most 
popular cause and effect arguments is the “failed-state” advanced by Singer (2001). According to 
this argument, the rise of madrassas is linked to the poor Pakistani public school system: 
 
“The reason for the madrassas new centrality stems from the weakening of the 
Pakistani state…the madrassas became immensely popular by targeting the lower 
class and refugee populations, whom the Pakistani state has failed to provide 
proper access to education.” (Singer, 2001) 
 
This kind of coverage has fostered two conclusions: madrassa enrollment rates are high 
and increasing, and the popularity of madrassas should be understood as a response by the poor to 
the government’s inability to provide public education and social welfare. Where is the evidence? 
3. The Data About Madrassa Enrollment 
We examine three important questions related to madrassa enrollment: the number and 
fraction of children (both school-aged and enrolled) enrolled in madrassas; the geographical 
variation in madrassa enrollment across Pakistan; and enrollment trends over time with particular 
attention to two benchmarks—the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (and the rise of the Jihadi 
movement against them in 1979) and September 11, 2001.  
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3.1  Data Sources 
We use three different types of data to verify our estimates and determine how sensitive 
they are to changes in definition and the year of the survey. Two sources are nationally 
representative, but date from 2001 or before, the third is data from a census of households carried 
out by the authors in 2003 as part of a project on educational choice. The first source is the “long” 
form of the population census in 1998, which is a large sample-based survey with information on 
enrollment. This survey is representative at the level of the district and region (rural or urban) and 
provides comprehensive coverage of the entire country.7 We use this data to examine enrollment 
patterns across districts. The second type of data, based on household surveys, are different 
rounds of the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) carried out in 1991, 1998 and 2001. 
While the data is not as extensive as the census, it contains detailed household information on 
schooling and income, and has been used extensively by researchers both in Pakistan and the 
United States. Finally, we use the census of schooling choice among households that our research 
team conducted in August 2003 (referred to as the project on “Learning and Educational 
Achievement in Punjab Schools”, or LEAPS). These data are only for three districts in the 
province of Punjab, but is very recent, was conducted by an independent team of academics, and 
is a complete census of all households in the selected villages. Consequently, it yields sufficient 
madrassa enrollment to examine correlations with household attributes in a meaningful manner 
(this data source provides information on four times as many children as the PIHS). Table A2 in 
the appendix shows how these different data sources are used in the paper. 
Each source asks about madrassa enrollment in a slightly different but comparable way. 
The population census (1998) asks about the field-of-education (“What is name’s field of 
education?”) with options that include (for instance) engineering, medicine, or religious 
education. This question is also asked of all literate adults irrespective of their current enrollment 
status, allowing for comparisons in the stock of religious education over time. The PIHS rounds 
ask, “What type of school is name currently attending?” with options that include government 
school, private school, or deeni-madrassa (religious schooling). Finally, the LEAPS census 
directly asks, “Is the child enrolled in a madrassa or an Islamic education school?” Fortunately 
these different questions all give rise to similar numbers. This is reassuring since it suggests that 
any one particular result is not driven by the specific question or definition that was used. 
                                                 
7 This is complemented with the census of private schools carried out by the Federal Bureau of Statistics in 2000 
(www.statpak.gov.pk). 
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3.2  How Many? 
According to the 1998 census of population, 159,225 students (all ages) were enrolled in 
madrassas; this represents 0.31 percent of all children between the ages of 5 and 19 (Table 1, 
Row 1). Since the total gross enrollment rate (the gross enrollment rate or GER is defined as total 
enrollment divided by the number of “eligible” children—in this case, children between the ages 
of 5-19) is 45 percent, madrassa enrollment as a fraction of total enrollment increases to 0.7 
percent. The numbers from the PIHS are very similar—with between 151,000 and 178,000 
children enrolled in madrassas across the 1991, 1998 and 2001 rounds, this accounts for less than 
1 percent of all enrollment (around 0.7 percent of all enrollments in the 1991, 1998 and 2001 
rounds). Despite the different definitions used and the problem of accurately estimating a low 
probability event in the PIHS (these surveys typically identify less than 100 children enrolled in 
madrassas), the numbers are well within the standard error bounds, and within 0.1 percentage 
points of each other—that is, there is less than 1/1000th of a difference between the percentages of 
enrolled children going to madrassas depending on the different sources. 
These numbers can be benchmarked to enrollment in regular schools. Public schools run 
by the government enrolled between 16 and 17 million children in 1998 (Census of Pakistan, 
1998); private schools enrolled almost one-third as many, at 6 million in 2000 (Federal Bureau of 
Statistics, Survey of Private Educational Institutes in Pakistan, 2000). As a percentage of children 
between the ages of 5 and 19, government schools accounted for 33 percent and private schools 
for another 12 percent. Again, since roughly one-half of all children between the ages of 5 and 19 
are enrolled in school, as a percentage of enrollments these numbers approximately double to 73 
percent and 26 percent.8 This comparison suggests that there are 38 times as many children in 
private and 104 times as many in government schools compared to madrassas.9  
                                                 
8 Boys are more likely to be enrolled in madrassas compared to girls. The census reports that there are only 43 females 
enrolled in madrassas for every 100 males. This imbalance is significantly greater than the 68 enrolled females for 
every 100 enrolled males  in overall education. For both boys and girls, madrassa enrollment starts off at the same age 
cohort between 5 and 9 years, but girls’ enrollment drops off sharply while boys enrollment jumps for children between 
10 and 14 and then tapers off for the cohort in their mid-twenties. That there are fewer females in madrassas is not 
surprising, but the similar number of girls as boys in the youngest age category is somewhat unexpected. Interestingly, 
for children between 5 and 9, the enrollments sex ratio is slightly higher in madrassa than in general education (76.9 vs. 
75.6 percent) but drops off at a much faster rate in the madrassa as children become older. The usual disclaimers about 
the numbers being too small to draw finer comparisons still apply. 
9 We could also compare these numbers to enrollment across countries. In their work on religious enrollment, 
Berman and Stepanyan (2003) compare a number of countries, including Pakistan (albeit based only on the PIHS). The 
comparison is fraught with difficulties, since they sometimes uses stocks and sometimes flows and the data is at times 
at the household level and others at the individual level. Nevertheless, using their numbers, as a percentage of total 
enrollment, madrassa enrollment in Pakistan is roughly equivalent to that in Bangladesh and Côte d’Ivoire and much 
less than in India (two states only) or Indonesia. Interestingly, madrassa enrollment in Pakistan corresponds closely to 
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There may be grounds for skepticism about these estimates for madrassa enrollment. 
Since the data were collected prior to 2001, geopolitical changes after September 11 could have 
led to greater madrassa enrollment. In addition, the household-based survey faces the usual 
problems of accurately estimating a low-probability event—although enrollment is less than 1 
percent in these surveys, the sampling error is large (see Bauman, 2001, for a description of 
similar problems in estimating home-schooling in the United States). Finally, while the census of 
populations does not face the problem of small samples, it is not that recent (1998) and some may 
have reservations regarding the quality of government data.10 
The LEAPS census of schooling choice conducted in 2003 provides a rough check on 
these numbers (see appendix for details). This census was conducted in three districts of Punjab 
and villages were chosen randomly based on the criterion that each village must have at least one 
private school. Typically, this means that the villages lies somewhere between fully urban and 
fully rural populations and are not representative of the districts that they are in. 
Estimates from the LEAPS census show that as a percentage of enrolled children, the 
numbers in two of the three districts are slightly higher than those of the population census. In the 
third (Rahim Yar Khan) there is a large difference, with the census reporting that 1 percent of all 
school-going children attended madrassas, and the LEAPS showing that the fraction is closer to 
3.7 percent (Table II). There are three potential explanations for this difference. First, the LEAPS 
data is not representative of the district and could be off the mark for districts with wide variation 
in madrassa enrollment across rural and urban samples. Second, the experience of the last five 
years could have varied dramatically across districts—in some, the enrollment fractions did not 
change and in others it increased substantially. Third, the data could point to systematic problems 
with the census estimates from certain districts, or the statistical problems that arise when we try 
to estimate low-probability events.  
3.3  Explaining the Differences 
A number of reasons could account for differences between the estimates presented here 
and those in the popular press. 
1. Differences in the sampling unit. Our estimates are all based on household surveys—an 
interviewer goes to a household and asks about the enrollment status of every child. Some 
                                                                                                                                                 
census estimates of home rather than religious schooling in the United States—the former ranges from 1 to 2 percent 
(Bauman 2001) while the latter is closer to 8 percent (National Center for Education Statistics, 2001). 
10 In our own analysis, we find the quality of the data generated by the Federal Bureau of Statistics in Pakistan to 
be consistently high. We have used the FBS Census of Private Schools (PEIP, 2000) to guide our fieldwork and 
feasibility study for LEAPS and found it tallied with the situation on the ground quite well, even in remote villages.  
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estimates in the literature are based on establishment surveys, where interviewers go to 
madrassas and ask about total enrollment in the institution. Our numbers could be lower than 
the actual enrollment if a significant proportion of those enrolled in madrassas are not linked 
to any household. This could happen if the share of orphans in madrassas is higher than their 
share in regular schools. While there are no countrywide estimates, a study by the Institute of 
Policy Studies in Islamabad (2002) found that 15 percent of all children enrolled in a sample 
of madrassas were orphans. In the worst-case scenario (where all orphans are enrolled only in 
madrassas), our numbers would have to be inflated by 15 percent to arrive at actual 
enrollment. 
2. Differences in definition. We define a child as enrolled in a madrassa if he or she is enrolled 
full-time in such an institution. Alternative definitions also include those who are enrolled 
full-time in regular schools, but also attend madrassas (usually for evening classes) for 
lessons on the Quran. Thus, the police estimate for madrassa enrollment in Punjab is 235,000, 
which is substantially higher than the census estimate of 96,000. However, the police 
estimate includes children who are studying part-time; in all our data sources, these are 
excluded. 
If we take for granted that the existing data sources are dated, then reality is better 
represented by the more recent LEAPS census data. In this case, total enrollment in madrassas, 
using a population-weighted average across the three districts would be 1.7 times that in the 1998 
government census. Adding in a (generous) 5 percent enrollment growth rate for every year, this 
puts the total number of children enrolled in madrassas at 410,000. This estimate is still 
conservative if a substantial fraction of children in madrassas are orphans not be picked up in 
household-based surveys. Thus, to arrive at a liberal estimate, we can add in a further 15 percent 
for orphans to take the total up to (approximately) 475,000, which is still below the lowest 
estimate in the existing literature. 11 
                                                 
11 Police surveys in Punjab and Sindh quoted in the literature estimate that there are 253,125 students enrolled in 
madrassas in Punjab in 2002 and 264,169 in Sindh in 2003. Our equivalent number from 1998 for the Punjab is 96,125. 
For Sindh the number is ten times greater than that in the census, with Karachi accounting for all the difference. While 
we try to investigate further, there are two observations. First, there is no information available on the methodology of 
the police surveys. Our interviews suggest a lack of documentation, certainly when compared to those of established 
statistical surveys. We have no way of knowing whether these numbers are from enrollment records in the madrassas or 
children attending on a given day or whether they are based on a census of establishments or a sample. Second, the 
police surveys are establishment-based surveys that include all students who attend madrassas (full-time students and 
children attending part-time for Quranic literacy classes), whereas the census and PIHS question include only those 
who attend madrassas full-time. Anecdotal evidence suggests that small stints in a madrassa, either for Quranic literacy 
or for a short time after primary school is fairly common. 
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Particularly surprising is the vast discrepancy in madrassa enrollment as a fraction of 
enrolled students. Our estimates suggest close to 1 percent, while the only other estimate in the 
literature (International Crisis Group, 2002) puts the number at 33 percent. Even if the number of 
children enrolled in madrassas were 1.5 million, the highest estimate in reports and articles, this 
would still imply that 3 percent of all children in the educational system are enrolled in 
madrassas. Are we totally off the mark? 
The International Crisis Group report based its estimate on two different statistics—the 
total number of children enrolled in madrassas, and the total number of children enrolled in all 
schools. It cites the total number of children enrolled in madrassas at between 1 and 1.7 million, 
and this figure is based on an interview with the Pakistani minister for religious affairs, Dr. 
Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi.12 For the total number of enrolled children, the report references the 
Economic Survey (Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, 2002) and claims that 
enrollment in primary schools in 2001 was 1,992,132. Taken together, these two figures suggest 
that one-third of all children going to school were in madrassas. 
What the Economic Survey (2002) actually says is “Enrollment at primary, middle, and 
at higher levels were 19.92 million, 4.28 million, and 1.79 million respectively.” This line in the 
text is corroborated by a table showing information on educational statistics, in which primary 
enrollment is stated as 19,921,232. The report omits the second ‘2’ in the Economic Survey 
number, leading to an estimate off by a factor of ten. It is unfortunate that the report, which is 
informative in other respects, is marred by this fundamental mistake. Equally unfortunate is the 
immediate validation and propagation of this number without any attempt to “fact-check” the 
total enrollment numbers.  
4.  Variation across Districts and Time 
Using the published data sources we can also look at how madrassa enrollment varies 
across different districts—the difference between Attock and Rahim Yar Khan in the LEAPS data 
suggests that this may be substantial—and we can look at how such enrollment has changed over 
time. Both these exercises yield similar conclusions, pointing to the importance of the border 
region with Afghanistan and the impact of the Afghan war years on time trends in madrassa 
enrollment. 
                                                 
12 In a separate interview with one of the authors of this note (July 28th 2004) Dr. Ghazi confirmed these 
estimates although he did not identify a verifiable source, citing security reasons. 
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4.1  Variation across Districts 
Pakistan is divided administratively into four provinces with 102 districts—Punjab, 
Balochistan, North-West Frontier Provinces (NWFP), and Sindh—plus the federal capital 
Islamabad, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the federally administered Northern 
Areas and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). The four provinces or Punjab, Balochistan, Sindh 
and NWFP, together with Islamabad, account for more than 97 percent of the population. 
Geographically, parts of Balochistan, the NWFP and FATA border Afghanistan. Sindh and 
Balochistan are sparsely populated provinces, with the exception of Karachi in Sindh, which is 
the single biggest metropolis in the country with a population approaching 10 million. We use 
data from the population census, 1998, as well as the census of private schooling, 2000, to 
provide estimates of madrassa, private, and government school enrollment in each district except 
for those in the province of FATA. 
The geographical dispersion of madrassa enrollment depends on how we define madrassa 
prevalence. There are three alternatives. We could present a geographical breakdown of the total 
number of children enrolled in madrassas. This number is related to the total population of the 
district, and may thus reflect only the size of the district relative to others. Another option is to 
use the equivalent of the gross enrollment ratio (GER), defined as the total enrollment divided by 
the number of “eligible” children—in this case, children between the ages of 5-19. This statistic 
provides an estimate of the “penetration” of madrassas, but it does not take into account the 
overall enrollment decision of the family. Thus, a district with two children enrolled in 
madrassas, and 20 children enrolled in private or public schools out of a total of 100 children will 
have exactly the same gross enrollment ratio (GER) as a district with two children enrolled in 
madrassas and 98 children enrolled in regular schools. To the extent that we want to distinguish 
between these two districts, a third statistic, the ratio of children enrolled in madrassas to total 
enrollment (the madrassa fraction of enrollment or MFOE), can also be used. The picture changes 
dramatically depending on whether we use the raw numbers or the ratio of children enrolled in 
madrassas to total enrollment. However, since enrollment in madrassas is highly correlated with 
total enrollment, there is little difference in the pattern of madrassa enrollment whether we use the 
GER or the fraction of enrolled children in madrassas. 
Figure 1a shows the number of children enrolled in madrassas for every district in the 
country. As expected, numbers are closely linked to population size—the three most populated 
districts account for one-quarter of the enrollment, with the bulk of enrollment in large urban 
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metropolises. Madrassa enrollment is also higher in the Saraiki language belt districts of Southern 
Punjab (for instance, Rahim Yar Khan) compared to the rest of the country.  
The fact that the number of children enrolled in madrassas is higher in more populated 
districts indicates nothing more than the size of the district. Figure 1b normalizes this number 
with total enrollment. Districts in the dark solid colors have high madrassa enrollment compared 
to total enrollment (still less than 7.5 percent), and districts in diagonal stripes have the lowest 
enrollment fractions in madrassas. What stands out is the very high madrassa fraction along (and 
only along) the western border with Afghanistan. This is the Pashtun belt—the “Pashto” speaking 
population most directly influenced by events in Afghanistan.  
Pishin (the district bordering the Kandahar region of Afghanistan) is the only Pashto 
speaking district in the top 15 when we use the total number of children enrolled in madrassas, 
but when we deflate this number by total enrollment (or the number of eligible children) all the 
top ten districts are in the Pashto speaking belt. If we use 2 percent of total enrollment as a cutoff 
for “extreme” madrassa enrollment, all 14 districts that can be classified as such are either in 
Balochistan or the North-West Frontier Province. Leaving aside the Pashtun belt and Karachi, 
madrassa enrollment in the rest of the country is spread very thinly across all districts. That is, 
rather than districts with high enrollment and districts with low enrollment, a very small number 
of children in every district are enrolled in madrassas. Seventeen districts fall in the 1 to 2 percent 
MFOE group with the remainder reporting madrassa FOE below 1 percent. For the bulk of the 
districts in the country, madrassa enrollment falls between 0.02 and 1 percent of total enrollment. 
Thus, there are two distinct geographical patterns of madrassa enrollment in the country. 
Enrollment is systematically higher among districts that border Afghanistan (still with just over 4 
percent of enrolled children in madrassas in all of them except Pishin). Apart from this group, 
enrollment is thinly spread among all districts in the country. Perhaps this pattern also reflects 
variation in the types of madrassas in these different areas—clearly, differences (if any) between 
madrassas in the Pashto belt and the rest of the country is a potential area for research. 
4.2 Variation across Time  
The PIHS data show that  the growth in madrassa enrollment during the 1990s was the 
same as that in enrollment in all schools. In fact, madrassa enrollment as a fraction of total 
enrollment decreased marginally, although the differences are well within the margin of error. 
Since the absolute number of madrassa-going students increased by 16 percent over the 10 years, 
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the decline in the proportion was due to slightly higher growths in overall enrollment during this 
period.  
Over a longer time horizon, we also compare the stock of individuals who stated a 
religious “field-of-education” on the census long-form. This cohort-based analysis assumes that 
changes in madrassa enrollment will be picked up 10 to 14 years after the birth of the relevant 
cohort. That is, a sudden increase in 1980 would correspond to an increase in the stock of 
individuals reporting religious education for the cohort born between 1966 and 1970.  
The stock of individuals reporting religious education as their “field” displays a distinct 
U-shaped pattern (Figure 2). People born between 1944 and 1948 were more likely to have 
religious education than those born between 1949 and 1953. This pattern continues until the 
cohort born between 1959 and 1963, then stabilizes for the next two cohorts and finally starts 
increasing. Those born between 1974 and 1978 were more likely to report religious education as 
their field than those before. This increase continues until the last cohort we have completed 
educational history data for, those born between 1979 and 1983. 
Interestingly, the downward trend halts for the age-cohort that comes of school-going age 
in the years surrounding the rise of the Zia-ul-Haq military government and the ensuing religion-
based resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan starting in 1979. Further, the largest jump 
is in the cohort born in 1979-83. This cohort would be 10 years of age in the period 1989-93—
coinciding with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Taliban.  
5.  Variation across Households 
This section looks at variation in madrassa enrollment at the level of the household. This 
study was not designed, and is not capable of, presenting definitive statements regarding the 
choice of madrassas among households as a schooling choice. As such, we do not attempt to go 
beyond simple tabulations and associations. Nevertheless, the exercise adds some value to our 
understanding of madrassa enrollment.13  
Previous studies on this important question (Berman and Stepanyan, 2004) have been 
hampered by small sample sizes on the one hand (there are 100 children who attend madrassas in 
                                                 
13 Differences in madrassa enrollment could be driven by differences across villages rather than households—i.e., 
in some villages all the children go to madrassas and in others none of the children attend. Most of the variation in 
madrassa enrollment (in the set of enrolled children) is within rather then between villages. For example the difference 
in enrollment ratios in a village at the 90th percentile of madrassa enrollment and one at the 10th percentile is only 3.4 
percent. This also holds at the more disaggregated settlement level (some villages have more than one settlement), 
although less strongly, with more variation stemming from within settlement differences than between. 
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the PIHS data) and lack of household-level data (the census only provides district-level 
aggregates). In contrast, the LEAPS census has schooling choice data on 150,000 children at the 
household level; even with 1 percent enrollment, this gives us 1,500 children enrolled in 
madrassas, a number that is sufficiently large to draw meaningful conclusions.  
We first ask a simple question. If we look at households who have a child enrolled in a 
madrassa, what do the schooling choices of other children in the household look like? We look at 
households that had at least two enrolled children, and classify them as (a) “all madrassa” if all 
the children attend a madrassa, (b) “madrassa/public” if at least one child goes to the madrassa 
and one to a public school, (c) “madrassa/private” if one attends the madrassa and the other 
attends private school and (d) “madrassa/public/private” if the households had 3 or more enrolled 
children using all three options simultaneously. Finally, we repeated this exercise in households 
with at least one child going to public school and with one child going to private school. 
The results are startling (Figure 3). Among households with at least one child enrolled in 
a madrassa (call them “madrassa households”) only 23.5 percent can be classified as “all 
madrassa” households. The majority of “madrassa households” (just under 50 percent) use both 
madrassas and public schools, and another 28 percent use either madrassas and private schools or 
all three simultaneously. Among households with at least one child enrolled in private school,  
48.5 percent enroll all their children in private schools and another 49.6 percent use the 
private/public option simultaneously. If the choice of a madrassa or a private school provides 
information about the ideology of the household, the data suggest that the choice of a private 
school is more ideologically driven than the choice of a madrassa. 
The fact that most variation in madrassa enrollment is within rather than between 
households implies that any predictions about who will send their child to a madrassa based on 
household attributes will be fairly poor. The comparison done by Berman and Stepanyan (2004) 
looked at differences between “madrassa households” and “non-madrassa” households. A similar 
comparison in the LEAPS data (Table III) shows an association between lower-income 
households and madrassa enrollment and households with less educated heads and madrassa 
enrollment, but the magnitude of these associations is small. The heads of “madrassa households” 
are illiterate in 7 percent more cases and slightly poorer (0.5 percent more likely to earn less than 
Rs.7500 per month).14 The largest difference between household types is their proximity to a 
                                                 
14 The significant difference between madrassa and non-madrassa households in terms of income arises only 
when we use Rs.7,500 as the monthly income cutoff to distinguish poor and non-poor households—alternative cutoffs 
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private school—among households with a child in a madrassa, 49 percent live in settlements with 
a private school; this number is 72 percent for households with no children in madrassas. 
6.  Taking Stock: What can we say about established hypotheses? 
Although the last finding could be seen as supporting the theory that madrassas have 
emerged as the only viable alternative to poor government schooling, a closer look shows that the 
prevalence of private schools substantially complicates matters. We look at the fraction of 
children enrolled and the market shares of schools offering public, private, and madrassa 
education under three different scenarios. One scenario is when both private and public schools 
are present in the settlement, the second is when either a private or a public school exists (non-
exclusively), and the third when neither is available in the settlement that the household is located 
in.15  
Three interesting findings emerge (Figure 4).  
1. In settlements with both private and public schools, the share of private schools increases 
with income. Nevertheless, even among the poor more than 30 percent of all families 
send their children to private schools. Madrassas account for less than 1 percent of all 
enrollments, and this share is no higher among the poor compared to the rich. 
2. In settlements with either a private or a public school the exact same patterns are 
observed with regard to income and again, madrassa shares are no different among the 
rich and the poor. 
3. In settlements with no public or private schools the enrollment patterns are very different. 
The largest differences arise in the choice of enrollment, rather than schooling choice 
conditional on enrollment. In settlements without a public or a private school, families 
are more likely to exit from the educational system altogether rather than enroll their 
child in a madrassa. The drop in enrollment is dramatic, falling from 70 percent to 40 
percent among the poor and from 87 percent to 68 percent among the rich. The market 
share of the different types of schools also changes. Government schools and madrassas 
increase their share while the private schools share drops. However, the increase in the 
market share of government schools is insufficient to overcome the drop in enrollment, so 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Rs.2,500 or Rs.5,000 show no significant differences between poor and non-poor households. Importantly, 97% of 
all households earn below Rs.7,500. 
15 Recall that the LEAPS sample was taken from a list frame of villages that had at least one private school. To 
look at schooling choices under these three scenarios, we divided villages into settlements and plotted enrollment 
shares in each type of settlements. These settlements are often far from each other, and thus act more as self-contained 
units than the administrative definition of a village. In the LEAPS data, there are 112 villages, but 253 settlements, 
generating considerable variation for this exercise. These findings are robust in a multivariate regression context.  
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that total number of children in government schools still declines; the opposite is true for 
madrassas. These settlements are also the only ones where there is a clear relationship 
between income and madrassa enrollment—among the poorest, 4 percent of all enrolled 
children are in madrassas and among the rich this decreases to 2.5 percent.  
These numbers suggest that the schooling decision for an average Pakistani household in 
a rural region consists of an enrollment decision (should I send my child to school) followed by a 
private/public decision, with a madrassas possibility. When there are no nearby schools, 
households exit from the educational system altogether although there is evidence of an increase 
in the market share of madrassas among the poor in these settlements. When both private and 
public schools are available, richer households exit to the private system, but there is no 
difference in madrassa shares with household income. It’s possible that when richer households 
use the private sector, resources are freed up for use in public schools leading to an overall 
increase in enrollment. 
The key issue then becomes the placement of public and private schools. Andrabi, Das, 
and Khwaja (2004) show that private schools overwhelmingly locate in villages where there are 
pre-existing public schools. This may not be an insurmountable barrier as 2,500 new private 
schools were set up between 1994 and 1995. Just three years later in 1998, 6,000 new schools 
were set up and in 1999 this increased to 8,000. Half of the growth in private schools occurred in 
rural villages. If current trends continue (and our data collected in 2004 suggests it will), the 
number of villages in Punjab province, with half the country’s population, with a private school 
will approach 50 percent by the end of the decade.  
These schools are not particularly expensive to attend. The median annual tuition fee in 
rural Punjab is Rs.650 (just under $1 per month). Using household expenditure data from the 
PIHS, this represents 1.7 percent of average household expenditure so that a family with 4 
children would spend 7 percent of total expenditure if all four children attended private schools 
(Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja, 2003). By comparison, the ratio of private school fees to household 
income in high-income countries is high—for instance, the average annual fees in a private 
school in the United States of $2,200 (National Center for Educational Statistics, 2001) 
corresponds to 9 percent of median per capita income. The analog in Punjab is closer to 2.5 
percent suggesting a four-fold difference in the tuition to income ratio across the two economies. 
A number of explanations apart from the “failed-state” hypothesis have been proposed in 
the literature. Another, equally valid hypothesis is that the rise of madrassa enrollment was linked 
to the Afghan war. The data does show a reversal of the declining trend in madrassa enrollment 
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between 1948 and 1965, with increases in the percentage of adults with religious education in the 
cohorts born after this date. There is also wide geographical dispersion in the prevalence of 
madrassa education in Pakistan. Although all districts report that less than 2.5 percent of children 
in the relevant age group (children between the ages of 5 and 19) are going to madrassas, the 
Pashto speaking belt that borders Afghanistan stands out in terms of the popularity of madrassas 
as an educational choice.  
The notion that the madrassa movement coincided with resistance to the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan is supported by the 1998 data from the population census. The increase in the 
stock of religiously educated individuals starts with the cohort that came of age in 1979 (the year 
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) and the largest increase is for the cohort co-terminus with 
the rise of the Taliban. Combined with the fact that the largest enrollment percentage in Pakistan 
is in the Pashtun belt bordering Afghanistan, this suggests events in neighboring Afghanistan 
influence madrassa enrollment. 
Is there something intrinsic about Pashtun sensibility or tribal culture that leads to higher 
madrassa enrollment? The differentiation of the Pashtun and non-Pashtun districts does not 
extend to Pashtun and non-Pashtun households in the LEAPS data. We find no evidence that 
Pashtun households are more likely to send their children to Madrassas compared to the rest of 
the sample, suggesting that geopolitical factors and geographical proximity to Afghanistan matter 
more than cultural preferences.16 
Similarly there is no evidence for religiosity or household preference-based models of 
madrassa enrollment. The radical religiosity argument suggests that children are more likely to be 
sent to madrassas when the family favors a radical brand of Islam. If true, what are we to make of 
the fact that more than 75 percent of all households with a child in a madrassa also send a child to 
a public or private school? In a multivariate context we checked whether households identified as 
“radically Islamic” were more likely to send their child to a madrassa.17 Again, we found no 
                                                 
16 The data from the LEAPS census asked about ethnic and caste identity, and households that classified 
themselves as “Pathan” or “Afghani” were used to represent Pashtun households. In line with the usual residential 
patterns of individuals with Pashtun backgrounds, most of these households are in district Attock in the North of 
Punjab. 
17
 In a largely Islamic country it is difficult to find good measures of religiosity. No data on religiosity was 
collected as part of the census and a more recent and detailed household survey that includes information on time-use 
elicits little variation—everyone reports high mosque attendance and regular prayers. An alternative, suggested by 
David Evans at Harvard University, which we pursue here, is to use recent developments in the use of “names.” 
Research by Fryer and Leavitt (2004) demonstrates the increasing use of names to define race identity in the United 
States. We postulate that households who named (at least) one child “Osama” (also spelt Usamah, Usamma or Usama) 
are more likely to favor a radical brand of Islam. The use of the name Osama was minimal until 1998, and then peaks 
in 1998 and 2001, following disruptive events. Of course, the naming of the child may reflect name recognition rather 
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difference between these households and others—the probability of choosing a madrassa 
increased by 0.40 percent, but the increase was statistically insignificant and small. 
Many interviews in the press suggest that madrassas provide free food and clothing and  
stipends to the poor. This implies significantly higher madrassa enrollment among poorer 
segments of the population, a view also advocated in a number of interviews with policymakers 
in Pakistan. The “three-scenarios” figure (Figure 4) shows that this is true only in settlements 
where there are neither private nor public schools. In general, the effect of income on enrollment 
overwhelms the effect on the choice of education type making madrassa enrollment lower as a 
percentage of population in poorer families than in richer families  
7.  Conclusion and Caveats 
Analysis of published data sources and the LEAPS survey shows that existing estimates 
in the literature of madrassa enrollment are highly exaggerated. Our most liberal estimate, which 
doubles the census/PIHS numbers and adds in a further 15 percent for orphans, is still below the 
lowest estimate in newspaper articles and policy reports. This imbalance is accentuated when we 
look at the fraction of children enrolled in madrassas, either as a percentage of school-aged 
children or enrolled children. This fraction has been overstated by a factor of 10 in The Los 
Angeles Times (2003), and 33 in the report by the International Crisis Group (2002).  Moreover, 
there is currently no evidence of a dramatic explosion of enrollment in madrassas in the 1990s.  
The geographical dispersion of madrassa enrollment helps us to understand the use of 
religious schooling. Madrassas are most popular in the Pashtun belt with the top ten districts  in 
terms of the fraction of enrolled children in madrassas all bordering Afghanistan (where they still 
account for less than 2 percent of all school-aged children). Time trends also support a strong 
Afghan war influence. Madrassas declined in popularity for cohorts born between 1947 and 1974 
and increased thereafter. The biggest jump is for the cohort born between 1979 and 1983; this 
corresponds to those children who would start attending school around the rise of the religion 
based resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It appears that this “Afghan” influence is 
related more to geographical proximity than to preferences for religious schooling among Afghan 
immigrants—the LEAPS data show no difference between Pashtun and non-Pashtun households 
in the use of madrassas. 
                                                                                                                                                 
than ideology and this must be kept in mind. To the extent that naming a child “Osama” is a good indicator of radical 
religiosity, we find no evidence of this effect in the data.  
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At the level of the household, most variation in madrassas enrollment is within rather 
than between families. Among households with at least one child enrolled in a madrassa, 75 
percent send their other child to a public or private school or both. Historians of religious 
education choices will find this reassuring—during the 18th and 19th centuries, most European 
countries  followed a similar pattern with one child sent to the church and others sent for a secular 
education (or no schooling at all).  
Are poorer families more likely to send at least one child to a madrassa? At an aggregate 
level there is little difference between poor and rich households in the choice of religious 
schooling. However, this masks an important difference between two different types of 
settlements. In settlements where other schooling options exist, less than 1 percent of all enrolled 
children go to madrassas and this fraction is the same for all income groups. In settlements where 
there are no other schooling options, the fraction of children going to madrassas increases and is 
higher among the poor compared to the rich (although it stays below 4 percent for all income 
groups). Nevertheless, the biggest difference between these two types of settlements is not the 
increase in the use of madrassas but the dramatic decline in overall enrollment. Thus, though the 
share of madrassas increases, this is offset by a sharp reduction in the size of the overall 
enrollment pie. 
It is likely that the number of settlements without public or private schooling options will 
reduce considerably during the next decade, primarily due to an ongoing dramatic explosion in 
the growth of private schools. In 1983 there were approximately 3,300 private primary and 
secondary schools in the four biggest provinces (Jimenez and Tan 1987)). In 2000 the same four 
provinces had 32,000 private schools, an almost ten-fold increase in less than two decades 
(Andrabi, Das and Khwaja, 2003). The growth in low-cost rural private schools is particularly 
dramatic, a point left out of the current debate on education in Pakistan. For the average child 
(even a relatively poor one), the most popular alternative to government schooling is a private 
school, not a madrassa. 
This paper does not address a number of important questions. Both case studies and 
personal visits suggest that madrassas vary in their character and the education that they impart, 
ranging from neighborhood evening religious education schools to those incorporating a more 
extreme radical militant view. None of the data sources distinguish between different types of 
madrassas. All types of madrassas are included in our enrollment estimates. Furthermore, we are 
unable to provide an in-depth view of madrassa goers. For a case-based approach with detailed 
studies of select madrassas see Stern (2000) and various press reports. These case studies describe 
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the mindset of madrassa students, teachers, and religious leaders and provide psychological 
portraits of such individuals.  
The results presented here will speak differently to people with different concerns. One 
concern is to obtain a better understanding of how madrassas are incorporated into the 
educational decisions of households. This paper has talked about madrassa enrollment in a 
framework well known to empirical economists, which deals with issues of poverty and school 
quality in developing countries. Phrased in terms of household choice (should I send my child to 
public school, private school, or a madrassa?), the inclusion of madrassas as a schooling 
alternative has a negligible effect on household decisions. Consequently, for those interested in 
individual decisionmaking, our results suggest that madrassas do not form an important part of 
the decision-making of the average (or even the 98th percentile) of Pakistani households.  
A second concern relates to global security issues and, under this view, absolute numbers 
matter. While we do not have data on whether madrassas promote extremist views and recognize 
that this is likely to differ across different types of madrassas, we can conclude that current 
estimates of madrassa enrollment—both absolutely and in percentage terms—are significantly 
overstated. Moreover, existing theories fail to adequately explain madrassa enrollment and 
largely ignore intra-household considerations which appear important.  
If a pro-active policy toward madrassas is necessary despite the small numbers, more 
sophisticated theories as well as additional up-to-date, publicly available and verifiable data are 
needed.  However, this is not an easy task. Given the spatial and temporal patterns of overall 
madrassa enrollment we found, and the very small percentage of children enrolled in madrassas, 
the only reliable way to capture such enrollment and the correlates of madrassa use is with very 
large-scale surveys, perhaps even censuses, in a representative sample of villages throughout the 
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Appendix 
Our first data source is the 1998 population census where the question asked on the long 
form is the type of schooling attended by the respondents. One of the coded response options is 
“deeni taleem”, exactly translated as religious education. The long form is not asked of every 
household, so the response is an estimate. However, the numbers are representative at the district 
rural/urban level. These census numbers are used for delimiting electoral constituencies and also 
as a sampling frame for most government and international surveys. We have used the census 
document for designing village level sampling and have found it to be generally consistent with 
our own fieldwork. We also exploit other district level data in the census document such as extent 
of public utilities like electrification and piped water as well as the quality of the housing stock 
(as a proxy for wealth) to correlate with religious enrollment. 
The second data source is the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey series where we use 
data from 199, 1998 and 2000. This is a widely used data set internationally for poverty and 
related matters. The data on religious schooling has been used by Berman and Stepanyan (2004) 
as well. In all three surveys the question is on type of school and Islamic/religious is a coded 
response option. 
Our third source is a specially conducted household educational census conducted by our 
research team in 125 villages in three districts of Punjab in 2003. This is an extremely rich data 
source that allows us to extensively look at school choice in rural Punjab at the household level as 
well as within the household. Here again, we classify a school as madrassah if it provides 
religious education and does not teach the state prescribed curriculum and a child as “enrolled in 
a madrassa” if he/she is attending a madrassa full-time The sampling for this data was based on 
an ongoing study of educational choices in Pakistan. We picked villages randomly from the three 
districts conditional on their having a private school. Typically, this meant that the villages in our 
sample are (a) bigger and (b) richer than the average village in the district. 
 
Problems of madrassa definition 
Finding the number of children who are enrolled in madrassas was not an easy task, even 
in a survey specially designed to understand schooling choice. Some unanticipated issues arose 
and future surveys might benefit from our experiences.  
First, children seemed to jump in and out of madrassas. That is, they would enroll in a 
regular school, then study in a madrassa for a year or two, and return to regular schooling after. 
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The numbers we present are the equivalent of a prevalence rate—that is, it counts the number of 
children who are currently studying in a madrassa. An alternative would be to capture the 
children who have ever studied in madrassas, which could yield different numbers. 
Second, the definition of a madrassa is unclear. We have defined madrassas as schools 
that teach a religious curriculum rather than that proposed by the ministry of education. There are 
schools in our sample that teach the government prescribed curriculum but add some elements of 
religious teaching and are not explicitly involved with any sectarian or religious group. This is in 
line with the approved principle of “additionality” of the ministry of education and most private 
schools that want to teach computer science or other additional subjects follow this regulation. 
We do not count these as madrassas (one type of school that could be mistakenly counted as a 
madrassa is a mosque school. These are schools housed in mosques that teach the normal state 
curriculum by regular education department teachers. These were started in the sixth five year 
plan (1983-1988) under the Junejo government as a cost effective way to use mosques but the 
program was not picked up later and is now gradually dying out. There are 8000 or so mosque 
schools in Punjab (EMIS)). 
Third, since our survey is household based, it will not pick up orphans who are not based 
in a household. One of the roles that madrassas play is to provide insurance and support. 
Consequently, case-studies suggest that enrollment in madrassas among orphans may be higher 
than among the general population.  
Table A3 shows what happens under alternate assumptions regarding the definition of 
madrassas. The table presents three different estimates, the lowest of which we call the 
“conservative” estimate and the highest the “liberal” estimate. Typically, allowing for more 
liberal estimates doubles the percentage of children enrolled in madrassas; for this paper we use 
the moderate estimate as the relevant number.  
This doubling though highlights an important problem. Since madrassa enrollment is very 
small as a percentage of the total, estimating the number precisely requires very large samples 
and a precise definition of what we mean. Despite interviews of over 150,000 children, we 
capture only 1,500 enrolled in madrassas. Small changes in the definition cause small absolute 
changes in the percentages, but could dramatically change the overall number. Likewise, for 
extremely low probability answers, errors in data entry even at a 1 percent rate can substantially 
affect the result. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1a: Number of Children Enrolled in Religious Schools, Pakistan 1998 
 
Source: The data for the districts is based on the “long-form” of the population census 1998. The long-form is 
administered to a sample of households in the census and is representative at the district/rural-urban level. We classify 




Figure 1b: % Children Enrolled in Religious Schools, Pakistan 1998 
 
Source: Population Census, 1998. The percent of all enrolled children in religious schools is defined as the total number 






































1988-1984 1983-1979 1978-1974 1973-1969 1968-1964 1963-1959 1958-1954 1953-1949 1948-1944
Source: Population Census, 1998
Literacy Source by Year of Birth
 
Note: Field of education is taken from the long form of the 1998 Population Census and is asked conditional on the 
interviewee being literate. Every bar shows the proportion of literature individuals in each birth cohort who report that 
they received a “religious education”. The first birth-cohort is individuals born between 1984 and 1988, who were 
therefore between the ages of 10 and 14 at the time of the survey. The last bar is for individuals born between 1944 and 
1948, who were between 56 and 60 at the time of the survey. We make no attempt to control for selection due to deaths 






























All Madrassa All Private
All Public Mixed
Households Generally
Source: LEAPS Population Census, 2003
Household Enrollment Choices
 
Note: This graph shows enrollment choices among households with at least two enrolled children that have one or more 
children attending a madrassa (top-left), a government school (top-right), a private school (bottom-left) and any school 
(bottom-right). By construction, households with private, government and madrassa enrollment 
(Madrassa/Public/Private) must have at least three enrolled children. Thus, among households with at least one child in a 
madrassa, close to 50% have another child who is enrolled in a government school. The last graph (Households 
Generally) shows how prevalent every type of household is—for instance, only 0.6% of all households have all children 











































































<Rs.2500 Rs.2500-5000 Rs.5000-7500 Rs.7500-10000 >Rs.10000
Expenditure
Source: LEAPS Population Census, 2003
Enrollment by Presence of School and Expenditure
Either Public or Private No Public or Private Both Public and Private
 
Note: This figure shows the fraction of children enrolled (top-left) and the share of each sector in that enrollment. The 
figure on the top-right shows the share of madrassas, the bottom-left the share of government and the bottom-right the 
share of the private sector. In every figure, we show the appropriate fraction for three types of settlement—those with 
both a private and a public school, those with either a private or public school (including settlements with both) and 
those with neither a private nor a public school. These settlements were constructed through a mapping exercise in 
every village, and for the 125 villages in our sample, we have 253 settlements. We plot the shares against the self-
reported monthly expenditures of the household. More than 95 percent of all households fall below the Rs.7,500 to 






COUNTRY-WIDE MADRASSA ENROLLMENT – DIFFERENT SOURCES 
Data Source Madrassa Enrollment Madrassa as Fraction of Enrolled 










PIHS 1991 151,546 
0.78% 
[0.16%] 
PIHS 1998 178,436 
0.74% 
[0.089%] 




Note: Survey standard errors in [brackets] where applicable. The census of population covers all of Pakistan except the 
Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). Included are Punjab, Balochistan, North-West Frontier Provinces 
(NWFP) and Sindh, plus the federal capital Islamabad and the federally administered Northern Areas and Azad Jammu 
and Kashmir (AJK). The Census of Population, 1998 estimates are based on the census “long-form”, which was 
administered on a sample basis to a large number of households. This data is representative at the district level for both 
rural and urban regions. The next three rows show estimates from the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) 
which is a household survey and is representative only at the provincial level for the four main provinces, which 






ENROLLED CHILDREN IN 3 DISTRICTS 
 School Type Data Source Attock Faisalabad Rahim Yar Khan 
Government (%) LEAPS 67.73 71.96 71.38 
Private (%) LEAPS 31.56 27.33 24.92 
Madrassa (%) LEAPS 0.71 0.70 3.70 
 Population Census, 1998 0.50 0.49 1.03 
 
Source: LEAPS, 2003. Population Census, 1998. 
Note: LEAPS reports school type for enrolled children ages 5 – 15. Population Census reports field of education for 
children 5-14. LEAPS sample villages were randomly drawn from a list-frame of rural villages with at least one private 













7500 No Land 
Settlement Has 
Private School 

















Source: LEAPS, 2003. 
Note: Standard error reported in parenthesis. Households are classified as “Madrassa Households” if one or more children 
are currently enrolled in a madrassa. “Non-Madrassa” households have at least one child enrolled in government or private 
school. Monthly expenditure under Rs. 7500 accounts for 97% of households. There is no difference in means between 





ARTICLES ON  MADRASSAS IN PAKISTAN MAJOR NEWSPAPERS, DECEMBER 2000 -JUNE  2004 
Source Date Type of study Numbers  Reasons for 
Madrassa 
Enrollment 
L.A. Times 28 
December 
2000 
Case-Study 8,000 Madrassas Studied Madrassa 
was originally set up 
for Afghan refugees 




10,000 Madrassas, 1 
million students 
Welfare service to the 
poor 
L.A. Times 12 August 
2001 
General article None Welfare service to the 
poor 
L.A. Times 19 
September 
2001 













Case Study 11,000 Madrassas, 1 
million students 
Boom during Afghan 
war. Fills a gap due 
to failed government 
education. 




Colin Powell and 
President Musharraf 









Financial Times 17 
November 
2001 










General article and 
interviews 
8,000 registered + 
25,000 unregistered 
On tribal border 
areas, madrassas 
instill Islam and 











L.A. Times 10 
December 
2001 



















Source Date Type of study Numbers  Reasons for 
Madrassa 
Enrollment 
Chicago Tribune 23 
December 
2001 
General article and 
interviews 




Chicago Tribune 23 
December 
2001 
 None Overwhelmingly 
popular with 
Pakistan’s poor, fill a 







General article and 
interviews 
10’s of thousands, 1 
million children 
Humanitarian aid for 
poor 
L.A. Times 3 January 
2002 
General article and 
interviews 
5,000 madrassas Religious 
indoctrination. 
Madrassas as training 
ground for Afghan 
was with Soviet 
Union 
L.A. Times 4 January 
2002 







News item on 
government 
6,000 madrassas None 
Chicago Tribune 13 January 
2002 











Chicago Tribune 18 January 
2002 
Case Study None Radical religious 
indoctrination 
L.A. Times 19 January 
2002 





New Item Thousands of 
madrassas 
Explosion during the 




Chicago Tribune 24 January 
2002 
Case Study None Radical Islam 
Washington Post 14 March 
2002 
General article 500,000 plus children Failed public 
educational system; 
Religious studies 
Poor children + 
orphans 
Boston Globe 18 March 
2002 




Source Date Type of study Numbers  Reasons for 
Madrassa 
Enrollment 
L.A. Times 23 March 
2002 
Case Study 3,700 (NWFP only) Islamic studies based 
on a reactionary 
curriculum; service to 
the extremely poor; 
failed public 
educational system 
Washington Post 28 April 
2002 
General article + 
Case Study 
7,000 madrassas Built for Afghan war 
against Soviet Union 
L.A. Times 29 June 
2002 
General article 1.5 million students Resistance to Soviet 
Union + Only 
schooling option for 
boys from poor 
families 
Chicago Tribune 30 June 
2002 
General article 8,000 to 10,000 
Madrassas 
Resistance to Soviet 
Union + Only 
schooling option for 
boys from poor 
families 
Washington Post  14 July 2002 General article and 
interviews 
10,000 madrassas 
1.5 million students 
Rapid growth in 
recent years 
Resistance to Soviet 
Union; fighters for 
Kashmir; failure of 
public education 
system; social charity 
function 
The Times 10 August 
2002 
Report 1.5 million students 




L.A. Times 12 October 
2002 
Report 8,000 to 10,000 
madrassas with 1.5 
million students 
 






 Madrassas reflect 
poverty of the state. 
Cater to poor people. 
Public educational 
system has failed 
Financial Times 8 February 
2003 
General article and 
interviews 
40,000 to 50,000 
madrassas 
None 
L.A. Times 14 April 
2003 
Report 10,000 madrassas, 
educate 10% of all 
Pakistani students 
Provide education for 
the poor; failures in 
public education 
system 
Financial Times 19 August 
2003 





Washington Post 2 September 
2003 
Report None Talks about 
madrassas in the 
Pashtun tribal belt 
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Source Date Type of study Numbers  Reasons for 
Madrassa 
Enrollment 
L.A. Times 5 March 
2004 
Report on politics 
regarding Musharraf 
Madrassas are not the 
focus 
Madrassas are not the 
focus 
Washington Post 13 June 
2004 
General article and 
interviews 







General article and 
interviews 
8,000 madrassas Afghan refugees 







DATA SOURCE DOCUMENTATION 




Representative for 4 
provinces that account 
for 97% of the 
population 
Very low numbers for 
children enrolled in 
madrassas. The low 
numbers make it hard 
to study associations at 
the level of the 
household.  
Representative 
numbers for madrassa 
enrollment in the 4 
provinces over time. 
PEIP 2000 Dataset on private 
schools, collected at the 
school level by the 
Federal Bureau of 
Statistics. Provides 
wealth of information 
on private schools, their 
location and enrollment. 
No household level 
information and no 
information on 
madrassas. Age of 
enrolled children not 
available. 
Size of private school 
enrollment. Often 
combined with 1998 





1998 Country wide coverage 
at the level of the 




aggregated at the level 
of the district. 
Numbers on country 
wide enrollment and 
geographical 
dispersion of madrassa 
enrollment in the 
country. Associations 




2003 Very recent data 
collected by the authors. 
Large number of 
children surveyed 
allows for flexibility in 
studying association 
between household 









districts or country. 
Presenting some 
recent numbers on 
madrassa enrollment. 
Associations at the 
















LEAPS MADRASSA ENROLLMENT ESTIMATES 


















Source: LEAPS, 2003. 
Note: Madrassa enrollment can be determined from several variables in the LEAPS dataset. Given data-entry and field 
errors, different estimates of madrassa enrollment can be obtained. Throughout this paper we use the moderate 
estimate. The conservative and liberal estimates should be viewed only as extreme lower and upper bounds. 
 
 
